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ABSTRACT
It has been suggested that computer interfaces could be made more usable if
their designers utilized cinematography techniques, which have evolved to guide
the viewer through a narrative despite frequent discontinuities in the presented
scene (i.e., cuts between shots). Because of differences between the domains of
film and interface design, it is not straightforward to understand how such tech-
niques can be transferred. May and Barnard (1995) argued that a psychological
model of watching film could support such a transference. This article presents an
extended account of this model, which allows identification of the practice of col-
location of objects of interest in the same screen position before and after a cut. To
verify that filmmakers do, in fact, use such techniques successfully, eye move-
ments were measured while participants watched the entirety of a commercially
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released motion picture, in its original theatrical format. For each of 10 classes of
cut, predictions were made about the use of collocation. Peaks in eye movements
between 160 and 280 msec after the cut were detected for 6 of the 10 classes, and
results were broadly in line with collocation predictions, with two exceptions. It is
concluded that filmmakers do successfully use collocation when cutting in and
out from a detail, following the motion of an actor or object, and in showing the
result of an action. The results are used to make concrete recommendations for in-
terface designers from the theoretical analysis of film comprehension.
1. FILM AND COMPUTER INTERFACE DESIGN
This article argues that computer interface design can benefit from as-
pects of filmmakers’ craft knowledge, but that identifying which aspects are
beneficial, and how they can be applied, is not straightforward. To do so,
we develop a general cognitive model of the perception of dynamically
changing scenes, using examples from filmmaking, which emphasizes the
need to present visual information in a manner that allows the all-important
primary task (in film, narrative comprehension; in human–computer inter-
action [HCI], achieving task goals) to be processed without interruption by
secondary tasks created by the need to repeatedly reorient to a changing vi-
sual scene. To test the assumption that this practice is actually successfully
employed by filmmakers, we present eye-movement data collected from
volunteers watching a commercial film. We illustrate the way that this par-
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ticular principle is currently violated in interface design and how it could be
usefully applied.
One of the major problems facing the designers of computer interfaces is
that of “screen real estate,” the limited amount of physical space available
for the display of information about the computer user’s task. The develop-
ment of windowing systems in the 1980s promised a solution of sorts by de-
fining tiled or overlapping rectangles of the screen so that information rele-
vant to the current, most important aspects of the user’s task could be
presented in a foreground window with other task elements partially hid-
den or relegated to background status in other windows. The user can carry
on the main task in the foreground window, interleaving other subsidiary
tasks at will by activating background windows. The operating system or
active software may create new windows to present task-relevant informa-
tion or to request user input, such as the destination file name following a
user’s selection of the Save command.
In the perfectly designed HCI, all of these windows would open and close
appropriately, displaying information exactly when users needed it, in such a
manner that they could immediately comprehend both its content and its rel-
evance to their ongoing task. Should users need to select a function, they
would know exactly what the icon looked like and where to find it on the
screen, or within which pop-up or pull-down menu it might be located, so that
they would not have to stop doing their primary task to indulge in time con-
suming searches of the interface and of their memory.
A frequent complaint of computer users, in contrast, is that the interfaces
they have to use are overcomplicated, or confusing, and that they neither
know what many of the icons and screen objects mean or do, or why they
come and go. When new windows open, even if the user is expecting them,
the information within them may not be arranged appropriately, so the user
has to actively search for the relation between the new and the previous
view. In this regard, computer interfaces have been compared disparag-
ingly with cinema films (e.g., Young & Clanton, 1993) in which film direc-
tors and editors frequently cut between shots to present new views of a
scene, of different scenes, and even of action occurring at widely separated
places and times. People rarely emerge from cinemas baffled by film cut-
ting, complaining that they did not know where to look or that they missed
crucial elements of the narrative because they were trying to work out what
the new shot meant.
Of course, this comparison is unfair in several ways. The computer user
is frequently engaged in several, more complex tasks than the viewer of a
film, who usually has just one task to perform (the comprehension of a nar-
rative that is usually contiguous and cumulative, guiding them through the
film). The progress of the film is completely under the control of its design-
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ers, and the viewer is passive in that they cannot change the film or alter its
rate of progress, whereas the progress of the HCI is largely under the con-
trol of the user, and the designers of an application have little control over
the context within which windows will need to be opened, or on the infor-
mation that they may need to contain. However, it must be emphasized
that an interface event is never directly caused by the user but is always a
result of a design decision. The fact that the cursor arrow appears on screen
in a particular place is not because the user has moved it there with the
mouse, but because designers have programmed their application to inter-
pret the hand movements detected by the mouse in a particular way. Every
single interface event has been designed—and needs to be designed
well—in the same way that every frame of a film has been constructed by
the film’s makers.
However, some of the differences between film and interface design
should work in the computer user’s favor, making interfaces easier to com-
prehend than film. The computer user is focusing on a specific train of in-
formation, whereas the film viewer may have to actively search the screen
to deduce which information is relevant. If a computer window opens in re-
sponse to some action that the user has performed, then the very fact that it
is related to their task means that they will have certain predictable seman-
tic or thematic knowledge that the designers can capitalize on. By present-
ing the information in the new window in a predictable physical position
with relation to the relevant information in the old window, the user will be
able to see and comprehend it without having to engage in an additional
search task.
This principle, which May and Barnard (1995) called collocation, is em-
ployed by filmmakers when they construct match cuts. Simply put, the film is
often cut so that the object that the filmmaker wants or expects the viewer to
attend to in the new shot is placed close to the position of the object that the
viewer can be expected to have been attending to in the previous shot. This is
just one of many strategies filmmakers use in making their products compre-
hensible, but as it is based on physical location rather than narrative or the-
matic relations between objects, it is potentially the most directly applicable
to interface design. May and Barnard (1995) presented an initial account of
the cognitive tasks involved in watching film, where filmic cuts that did not in-
terrupt the viewer’s propositional and implicational processing of the narra-
tive were distinguished from unfilmic cuts, which required the viewer to attend
to the object structure of the scene to relocate items of thematic relevance.
Match cuts are an example of filmic cuts; an example of unfilmic cuts are jump
cuts in which an attended object’s position or relation to another object is al-
tered. May and Barnard (1995) argued that computer designers could im-
prove the usability of their interfaces by employing filmic strategies, and
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avoiding unfilmic strategies, to support narrative and perceptual coherence in
the interaction.
That current interfaces do not generally follow such simple principles is
easy to demonstrate. Using your favorite graphics application, open a large
image and select the tool that allows you to zoom in on a detail (often rep-
resented by a magnifying glass or loupe icon). Click on a detail in any cor-
ner. If the interface uses the filmic principle of collocation, the detail should
be displayed in the same corner as it was before you clicked it (albeit
larger). Almost all applications actually move it to the center of the screen,
leaving you looking at some other detail. You have to relocate the detail
that you operated on. At least you can, with practice, learn that it will be
centered. Zooming out is implemented in even less predictable ways across
different applications (and many users do not know how to carry out the
operation, which usually involves the same tool and a simultaneous key
press).
The central argument of this article is that the design of computer inter-
faces could be improved if the interfaces made use of filmic principles, and
in particular, collocation of the thematic topic of the user’s task, whenever
the scene portrayed on the interface changes. At a more abstract level, it is
possible that the coherence of an interface could also be improved by
adopting filmic devices that have been developed to convey a sense of nar-
rative structure across shots and scenes, but that is beyond the scope of this
article. Here we concentrate on the organization and dynamic structure of
the visual scene from frame to frame across cuts (in film) and transitions (in
interfaces).
2. THE PROBLEM OF WATCHING FILM
Our ability to perceive, let alone comprehend, motion picture films has
long been recognized as a challenge by psychologists, especially for theo-
rists of visual perception. Because of the optical distortions created by the
camera, the image portrayed by a single frame of a film does not corre-
spond to a conventional perspective view of a scene. When frames are pro-
jected to make a motion picture, and edited, the relation between normal
vision and film becomes even more strained. The fact that we can still see
objects and understand their behavior is informative because it means that
the information provided by film does not violate the needs of basic per-
ceptual processes.
As early as 1916, Hugo Münsterberg (1970) compared the close-up shot to
perceptual attention, flashbacks to acts of memory and mental imagery, and
the sequencing of shots to the sequential direction of attention around a
real-world visual scene. Carroll (1980) reported that another early film theo-
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rist, Pudovkin, described the role of the film editor as guiding the viewers’ at-
tention to certain elements of the scene, the laws of editing therefore being the
same as those governing “ordinary looking.” He and other analysts (Balázs,
1970; Eisenstein, 1949) also discussed the use of close-up shots to magnify crit-
ical details to the exclusion of the surrounding scene, in the same way that a
viewer in the real world can concentrate on one part of the scene to the exclu-
sion of the periphery of their gaze.
Mamet (1991) wrote the following:
You always want to tell the story in cuts … if you listen to the way people tell sto-
ries, you will hear that they tell them cinematically. They jump from one thing
to the next, and the story is moved along by the juxtaposition of images—which
is to say, by the cut. (p. 2)
Lindgren (1963) compared film editing to prose narratives that describe a
scene object by object, detail by detail, but where the objects are spread
throughout a scene rather than being described in a linear spatial order.
Lindgren noted,
The fundamental psychological justification of editing as a method for repre-
senting the physical world around us lies in the fact that it reproduces this men-
tal process in which one visual image follows another as our attention is drawn
to this point and to that in our surroundings. (p. 62)
Although edited film, with its potential for large spatial and temporal jumps,
can present scenes and sequences that are very different to those experienced
in our real lives, it nonetheless relies on our ability to integrate different view-
points and attentional foci into a single train of thought. This forms the basis
for our cognitive analysis of film watching.
The value of applying an analysis of film to HCI was recognized by
Hochberg (1986), who advocated the study of film techniques to aid the
then emerging technology of computer-generated imagery. His argument
was that, despite the gross differences between real-life scenes and the im-
ages contained in films, and the optical distortions created by the camera,
filmmakers at least had the advantage of being able to point their cameras
at real-world events; so many of the constraints on object construction, ap-
pearance, and behavior that our visual systems might make use of were im-
plicitly recorded in the resulting film. Computer-generated imagery, on the
other hand, had no such constraints; its scenes could portray anything, be-
having in any fashion, at any level of veridicality, ranging from pixelated
monochromatic wire-frame sketches to high-resolution, anti-aliased photo-
graphic renderings complete with multiple light sources, reflections, and re-
ceding surface textures.
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In the two decades since Hochberg’s (1986) work, the computer-generated
image has become a ubiquitous component of commercial film, with the evo-
lution of novel representational techniques such as “bullet time” (in which ac-
tion slows to a crawl while the viewpoint revolves around a single element of
a scene, such as a bullet speeding from a gun toward its target). These forms of
portrayal have only become possible by digitally modifying film shot with
many cameras and editing it together into a seamless whole. It certainly bears
no relation to anything ever experienced by a human viewer of real events,
and yet is comprehended instantly, on first sight, by every moviegoer. In it-
self, this is evidence against the commonly held view that film techniques are
a form of convention or grammar that has to be acquired, and that film audi-
ences can only see and understand film because they are immersed in a cul-
ture pervaded by film.
Filmmakers have learned through one century of experimentation what
forms of dynamic scenes are easily comprehended by their viewers and
which are not. Their craft knowledge delineates the comprehensible from the
incomprehensible as well as any other body of empirical research that has
taken a century to collect. The knowledge is embodied in many textbooks
and handbooks written for trainee filmmakers, such as Maltby (1995), Rich-
ards (1992), Katz (1991), and Mamet (1991). Potentially, these books should
provide a source for us to find principles that could be applied to HCI. Of
particular interest to us is the way that different shots can be cut together, for
in these situations the whole view portrayed on the screen changes, and yet
viewers can quite easily make sense of a sequence of shots and may not even
notice the cuts. However, these books are all situated within the domain of
film, and it is not at all clear how the knowledge that they contain can be
transferred to interface design.
Katz (1991), for example, concentrated on camera positioning and compo-
sition within a shot, rather than on the relative composition of shots; he con-
fined his discussion of editing to the problem of when in the action cuts
should take place. In HCI terms, this might correspond to the conventional
concerns of what should go in a window, and where, and when it should open
and close; it does not inform us about the spatial and thematic relations be-
tween different windows or different sequential views within a window. Rich-
ards (1992) also wrote mainly about composition within the shot, but did dis-
cuss “matching” and commented,
If the subject is established in the right section of the frame, she must remain in
that area even when you are cutting to another angle. When it is a reverse shot,
logically one might think the placement of the subject on the reverse area is nec-
essary. However, this is not the case. In fact it tends to confuse the audience. The
simple theory is that the shifting of the viewers’ eyes from one area to another
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confuses them … our acceptance of the cuts results from keeping the figure in
the same frame area. (pp. 72–73)
This encapsulates the practical consequences of our argument about colloca-
tion and with practical implications for framing sequential shots.
Due to the experiential way in which craft knowledge is acquired by film-
makers, it is difficult to know when to apply particular principles, or to justify
using one rule rather than another. They are all part of the craft of film that has
to be learned by doing, by practical application of the apparatus of
filmmaking. Much of the filmmaking advice is directed rightly toward rapidly
and succinctly conveying narrative information or on leading the viewer to
infer motive and intention, aspects of filmmaking that are not directly rele-
vant to interface design. This makes it difficult to extrapolate the comprehen-
sion of dynamic scenes in general, and to interface design in particular. Even
when a specific and relevant principle can be elucidated, such as the use of
collocation in match cuts, it is not obvious when, or how, collocation should
or should not be used in interface design. Although insightful interface de-
signers who are also expert in film editing may be able to identify correspon-
dences between particular editing techniques and a concrete design problem,
a case-by-case approach to transferring knowledge between domains lacks
generalizability, and justification (necessary to convince other designers) is
slow and haphazard and prone to becoming rapidly outdated by advances in
interface and device technologies. A more principled way of mapping the
knowledge of film into the domain of interface design (and guidance on its
use) is necessary to provide a rationale for each design recommendation.
May and Barnard (1995) argued that to transfer the craft knowledge from
cinematography to interface design economically, an intermediate psycho-
logical account was needed, which described why the craft knowledge
worked in terms of their consequences for the viewers’ mental processing. By
explaining why certain forms of film cutting work and others do not, in terms
of the viewer’s information processing resources, we seek to show that it is
possible to derive principles that can be applied to the perception of dynami-
cally changing scenes in general. By expressing these principles in a form
compatible with wider psychological knowledge, we can go beyond the
source material to make recommendations that are applicable to interactive
dynamic displays in particular. In this article we elaborate May and Barnard’s
(1995) analysis; provide some empirical support for the assumption that film-
makers can and do use cutting to manipulate their viewers’ gaze direction;
and, using the theoretical analysis of the craft rules that have evolved in cine-
matography, suggest some guidelines for designers to follow to make dy-
namic transitions in their interfaces more film-like and, we argue, more com-
prehensible and usable.
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3. FILM THEORY FROM FILM CRAFT
The most influential of the early film theorists was Eisenstein (Glenney &
Taylor, 1991; Taylor, 1988). His “theory of montage” was an analysis of (ini-
tially) five types of montage that simultaneously coexist in any film sequence:
Metric Temporal length of individual shots.
Rhythmic The relation between the temporal lengths of successive
shots.
Tonal Commonalities in attributes of objects in successive shots.
Overtonal A sense or feeling emergent from the preceding three types.
Intellectual A rational abstraction of meaning from a sequence of shots.
This typology was largely developed to cover the patterns of cutting used
in his silent, monochrome films, and he later added a sixth type
(chromophonic montage) to deal with the synchronization of music and color.
Each of these types attempts to isolate a particular form of interpretation or
emotion aroused in the viewer by the sequence of shots. The typology seems
to prefigure later semiotic approaches to film analysis (e.g., Metz, 1974) deal-
ing as they do with the meaning that is to be inferred from the signs and con-
ventions of film, rather than from the content of the shot.
Another early theorist who examined film was Münsterberg (1970), who
related the sequencing of shots to the sequential direction of attention around
a real-world visual scene. In essence, this is the line that we are taking in our
assumption that the comprehension of film can be understood by recruiting
cognitive theory. Taking Münsterberg’s view with Eisenstein’s (1949/1972), it
is clear that the typology of montage must be comparable in some way to the
perception of noncinematic visual scenes. The scene portrayed by the camera
represents the standpoint of the viewer, and the assemblage of shots from a
single scene should therefore be consistent with the views that a person might
see if they were really there and able to direct their attention around the
scene, despite the fact that the physical behavior of the objects and features
represented in the film image is not the same as is experienced in real-world
perception, as detailed by Hochberg (1986). The similarities must be at a
more abstract level.
The first two types of montage are defined in terms of dynamic changes to
the scene. Metric montage corresponds to the length of time the viewer spends
looking at one particular point before turning their gaze to another focus (al-
though in film, that focus may be 1,000 miles or years away). Rhythmic mon-
tage represents the frequency with which a viewer looks back and forth be-
tween two points (e.g., between two people conversing or between two
intercut scenes, which may be separated as in metric montage) and hence
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conveys a sense of the speed or pace of the interaction that is being observed.
Both of these are critically dependent on the temporal dynamics of the edit-
ing. The other three are concerned more with the content of the shots being
edited together.
Tonal montage corresponds to a highly generic perceptual ability that al-
lows us to detect “common cause” in the motion or appearance of ob-
jects—Carroll (1980) cited Eisenstein as giving an example of the “dawn
mists” sequence in Battleship Potemkin, which repeats a rocking movement in
the motion of the water, the ships, the sea buoys, the sea birds, and the rising
of the fog. Objects that share attributes as we look around us may also reveal
some unobserved force or object. Similarly, overtonal, intellectual, and
chromophonic montage all relate to abstractions that must be inferred from the
content of the scene to understand the narrative of the film (or the nature of
the situation in which a real-world viewer finds themself). In all of these, the
identities, meanings, and associations of the objects being portrayed are more
important than their physical characteristics or visual features.
A notable difference between the representation on the screen changing
before a viewer’s stationary gaze and the viewer having to move their head in
a stationary world is the absence of proprioceptive feedback about the motion
and new position of the viewer’s head and eyes. This could mean that the
viewer is not able to relate the new shot to the preceding viewpoint, and this is
where the rules governing “allowable” cuts are generally invoked. A concise
list of shots is listed by Bernstein (1988, pp. 160–167): establishing shot,
close-up, reaction shot, cutaway, eyeline, eyeline match, jump cut, manipula-
tion of time, and parallel action. Although these largely define shots or se-
quences of shots, rather than cuts, these all make sense if considered in terms
of Münsterberg’s (1970) vicarious viewer. They are, in general, aimed at en-
suring that the points of view used in successive shots are consistent with
those of a single observer moving their gaze and focus of attention through a
scene, albeit with gross exaggeration and distortion of the scale of temporal
and spatial change.
Hochberg (1986) also listed the “kinds and uses of abrupt transitions” in
the visual scene that cuts caused, pointing out that it was not until the 1950s
that “Hollywood developed the art of invisible, or seamless, cutting … the
aim was to conceal from the viewer that a cut had been made” (p. 55). This
was not a trivial problem, for many abrupt transitions between shots are
readily perceptible and distract the viewer from understanding the scene.
Kraft (1986) contrasted the role of rhetorical and syntactic cutting in films,
where the former “influenc[es] the connotative and affective characteristics of
film sequences” and the latter served as visual punctuation “segment[ing] the
flow of filmed activities” (p. 155) to separate activities that needed to be
parsed in the grammatical manner suggested by Carroll and Bever (1976). His
334 MAY, DEAN, BARNARD
findings were that cutting did not serve a syntactic function, and that the num-
ber of cuts was not remembered. When viewers were asked to count the cuts,
they were able to, but their recall for the activities portrayed was poorer.
Therefore, they were able to attend to the physical structure of the film cut-
ting, or to the meaning of the scenes portrayed, but not both (Kraft, 1986).
Cuts that violated the cinematographic principles of “directional continuity”
impaired viewers’ ability to remember the underlying flow of action in the
story, whereas varying the camera angle had no effect (Kraft, 1987). His con-
clusion was that “violating directional continuity disrupted viewers’ expecta-
tions concerning cinematic space; these viewers were prevented from draw-
ing the necessary inferences for representing the underlying actions” (Kraft,
1987, p. 11).
Of course, the unfolding narrative within a film provides a background
constraint on what is being perceived; and if perception fails to make sense of
the visual scene, the narrative can be recruited to aid comprehension. Never-
theless, for the most part, films do not present us with such perceptual chal-
lenges, and their visual slickness allows us to concentrate on the narrative
without needing to struggle to make sense of the display, unlike many of our
computing interfaces. A consensus between these theorists is apparent: Rec-
onciling the abrupt visual changes that do occur in film relies on the same per-
ceptual processes that allow us to make sense of the real world; unfilmic cuts
present visual information in a way that is discordant with these processes,
and hence do interfere with the narrative comprehension. To make a map-
ping from the language and technology of film to computer interface design, a
model of these processes is an essential intermediate stage.
4. AN INTERACTING COGNITIVE SUBSYSTEMS MODEL
Our model is constructed within Barnard’s Interacting Cognitive Subsys-
tems (ICS) framework (e.g., Barnard & May, 1999; May & Barnard, 2003).
The ICS framework represents human cognition as a sequence of transfor-
mations of information from incoming sensory representations, through a
number of central mental representations, allowing the production of
effector representations that control overt behavior (movement, speech,
etc.). The transformations are grouped into subsystems that all deal with a
particular form of representation. There are three subsystems dealing with
incoming sensory representations (acoustic, visual [VIS], and body-state) and
four with central representations (object [OBJ], morphonolexical [MPL],
propositional [PROP], and implicational [IMPLIC]). Two further subsys-
tems (articulatory and limb) transform effector representations into actions.
For the purposes of this article, we need to consider the content of four of
these levels of mental representation:
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1. VIS: A sensory level of representation of the information extracted
from the retinal image in terms of edges, features, hues, contrast bound-
aries, and so forth; unintegrated and prior to any organization of these
features into shapes or objects. This level of representation can be trans-
formed to produce OBJ and IMPLIC representations.
2. OBJ: A perceptual level of representation in which the visual scene has
been parsed into coherent objects with orientation, spatial location, and
depth including inferred physical characteristics not necessarily di-
rectly available from the visual scene. This level of representation can
be transformed to produce PROP and limb (i.e., motor) representa-
tions.
3. PROP: A semantic level of representation in which entities within a
scene have distinct identities, properties, and relations with regard to
one another. This level of representation can be transformed to pro-
duce OBJ and IMPLIC representations and MPL (sound-based) repre-
sentations.
4. IMPLIC: A holistic level of representation in which the propositional
relations and sensory features of a scene combine to produce inferences
about the real meaning or importance of a scene (i.e., what the entities
are doing and why), drawn from the individual’s experience of the
world. This level of representation can be transformed to produce
propositional representations and to create somatic (SOM) and visceral
(VISC) changes in the body.
Each of the subsystems is able to receive representations in its own specific
format, store them, and transform them into a limited number of other repre-
sentations, as noted in the earlier descriptions. The cognitive models pro-
duced in ICS contain four main considerations. First, the behavior of the
complete mechanism depends on the particular transformation processes that
are required to support a cognitive task. This is referred to as a configuration
of processes. As described later, the basic configuration for the interpretation
of a visual scene requires visual input to be transformed into an object repre-
sentation. This will form the basis for the derivation of a propositional repre-
sentation of the events in the scene from which an implicational representa-
tion about their meaning can be inferred. There may also be subsidiary
transformations that are of interest, such as that using the propositional repre-
sentation to produce a mental verbalization (at the MPL level), but these are
not part of the basic configuration. The basic configuration is thus written as
VIS→OBJ, OBJ→PROP, and PROP→IMPLIC, although as seen later, ad-
ditional feedback processes are active too.
Second, each process in a configuration is constrained by the recodings it
has “learned” and can perform more or less automatically. This is referred to
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as the procedural knowledge embodied in the process. If a process cannot
easily transform a particular pattern of incoming information, then this will af-
fect the overall operation of the complete system. For the interpretation of a
film, we can assume that the procedural knowledge is all in place: that is, the
images on the screen, the events portrayed, and their meanings will all be
within the viewer’s body of experience; the processes would, in principle,
have little difficulty carrying out transformations of what is shown. This may
not be the case in the comprehension of computer interfaces where the dis-
play elements are more likely to be symbolic and abstract, and so would be a
clear point of departure for the modeling of cognition.
However, not all knowledge is represented in a proceduralized form.
Some is held as a form of episodic memory. Within ICS, this is dealt with by
the “image records” of the different subsystems. These are records of all rep-
resentations that a subsystem has processed in the past and provide for a de-
gree of abstraction over experience. Performance on a task may therefore also
depend on the nature and properties of the memory records that need to be
accessed. Therefore, the third consideration relates to the record contents ac-
cessed or used in the task setting. Of most relevance are the records that have
only recently been laid down, and integration of these over the short term will
allow for the recognition of just-seen objects, events, and so on.
These considerations deal with the capabilities of individual subsystems.
Because the dynamic course of cognition depends on interactions between
subsystems, a fourth consideration deals with properties relating to the over-
all dynamic coordination and control of the mechanism. This is referred to as
dynamic control and is intended to capture the status of representational re-
sources, the extent of their use, and how information flow is coordinated and
used in the internal monitoring and evaluation of configural activity. Because
the individual subsystems are independent and act in parallel, this consider-
ation is emergent from the requirements of the flow of information through
the mechanism as a whole—it should not be thought of as implying the exis-
tence of some “central executive” that sets up a configuration, controls mem-
ory access, or schedules competing tasks.
For our purposes, dynamic control can be thought of as a “bottleneck” in
processing: For example, if there is a problem with the transformation of the
propositional representation, then additional processing will be required in
the form of exchanges between this subsystem and others to elaborate and re-
fine the content of its input. The limits of the propositional output will con-
strain the performance of subsequent processes that operate on it, and so the
PROP subsystem will become the locus of dynamic control. Dynamic control
can shift between subsystems according to the task. If people are asked to no-
tice each occurrence of a particular object, then they will have to use the ob-
ject representation, because this is where that information is held.
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As a framework, the ICS perspective holds that an understanding of the
cognitive underpinnings of behavior in complex tasks can be achieved by
specifying properties of configurations, procedural knowledge, record con-
tents, and dynamic control. By characterizing the information that is available
for each process to operate on, we must make assumptions about the record
contents and the degree of proceduralization of each process. An ICS model
takes such approximate estimates as starting points and builds on them to
map out the subsequent course of cognitive activity.
5. MODELING FILM WATCHING IN ICS
In this section, we outline the set of processes in ICS that are involved in
the perceptual recognition of events portrayed in a film sequence and their as-
similation with the narrative. We restrict this model to those aspects that are
relevant to the problem of comprehending dynamic visual scenes, and so do
not attempt to include in our model the more abstract questions of the com-
prehension of the narrative itself. In principle, this would be the work of the
propositional and implicational levels of representation and, as we indicate,
the viewer’s understanding of the narrative is a component of their compre-
hension of the scene; but for now we can treat it as a given, without trying to
model it explicitly. The reason for this limitation is that, as indicated in Sec-
tion 1, the comprehension of a narrative is less important in HCI than in film,
and we wish to give guidance that does not require interface designers to deal
with these issues.
The configuration of processes illustrated in Figure 1 shows those that
would typically be required for a viewer of a film to observe and comprehend
the events portrayed—for simplicity, we deal with the visual input only; but
in principle, ICS can also be used to model the simultaneous acoustic input,
as we indicate. To begin with, the scene itself must obviously be processed
through the VIS subsystem (1). A copy process creates an image record of all
the information in the visual field—in Figure 1, the viewer has just watched
one of the actors raise and fire a gun. The full scene appears as the representa-
tion in the image record of the VIS subsystem. In parallel, the VIS→OBJ pro-
cess recodes the raw visual data into a higher order object representation,
which reflects a more abstract structural description of visual form. This pro-
cess of recoding involves information reduction as well as elaboration. For ex-
ample, the object code would not represent gradations of brightness, but
would now distinguish the form of objects.
Because these processes can only recode a single data stream at a time, the
actual recoding would also be selective. With the recoding of a visual repre-
sentation, selectivity would operate spatially and only part of the visual field
would be undergoing recoding (the “attended-to” element). Here the viewer
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Figure 1. The configuration of processing involved in the comprehension of a dynamic
scene. VIS = visual subsystem; OBJ = object subsystem; PROP = propositional subsys-
tem; MPL = morphonolexical subsystem; IMPLIC = implicational subsystem; SM =
schematic model; SOM = somatic changes; VISC = visceral changes.
may be attending to one part of the screen (e.g., the gun). The object level de-
scription of this element of the visual field is copied into the image record of
the OBJ subsystem. Note that the information represented in the OBJ subsys-
tem’s image record is qualitatively different to that in the visual image record,
reflecting the processing that has taken place.
Simultaneously, the OBJ→PROP transformation process in the OBJ sub-
system produces a propositional representation of the information (2). In this
recoding, the details of the appearance of the elements in the visual scene are
discarded, and an abstract semantic representation is created. This is copied
into the image record of the PROP subsystem—in this example, the proposi-
tional information linking the actor, P(Actor1), with the gun, P(SmokingGun).
The figure shows two transformation processes occurring in the PROP
subsystem (3). One, PROP→MPL, produces a morphonolexical representa-
tion from the information represented propositionally. Subjectively, this code
corresponds to what we hear as our internal mental voice or imagination, and
is descriptive of the propositional representation; but the process is not cen-
tral to the basic configuration that builds the viewer’s understanding of the
scene. At the same time that the PROP→MPL process is generating the inter-
nal speech, the PROP→IMPLIC process is also active (3). In this transforma-
tion, details of the individual propositions are lost and the highest level cogni-
tive representation of the scene is constructed, the implicational
representation. This process involves interrelating propositions, both among
themselves and in relation to prior experience as represented in the proposi-
tional image record. This process is therefore inferential in nature and ab-
stracts the overall meaning of the constituent propositions when taken as a
whole. The resulting schematic model (SM) is copied into the implicational
image record. The information encoded within it reflects the overall concep-
tual structure of the narrative. Here the viewer has inferred that a shot has
been fired (SM(Shot)) and someone has been injured (SM(Injury)), although
this has not yet been shown. This model, being implicational, is not restricted
to the bald fact that someone has been hurt but includes subjective feelings of
shock, surprise, and threat; its activation causes SOM and VISC changes
within the body of the viewer, via the IMPLIC→SOM and IMPLIC→VISC
processes (not shown in Figure 1).
The chain of cognition from the visual information in the scene, through
the object and propositional representations, has thus resulted in the viewer
generating an implicational understanding of the action portrayed, and an an-
ticipation of its consequences. However, this is not the end of the chain. We
can see that the IMPLIC→PROP process is active (4), generating a further set
of propositional representations from the implicational knowledge. The out-
put from this process may be combined with the other inputs to the PROP
subsystem. In this example, the consequence is that the input to the PROP
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subsystem is not just the bottom-up output from the OBJ subsystem’s inter-
pretation of the visual scene, but also the ongoing top-down effort of the
viewer to put what they are seeing into context, to construct the narrative.
Here the locus of dynamic control is at the IMPLIC subsystem, and the
IMPLIC→PROP transformation is not taking its input directly from the in-
formation reaching the subsystem, but is operating in a buffered mode, trans-
forming the data in the proximal region of the image record. Because the
“copy” process is continually transferring the input to the image record, the
effect of buffering is to free the IMPLIC→PROP transformation from the
timing constraints imposed on it by the pace of the incoming data and to let it
work at a speed appropriate to the formation of coherent propositional out-
put. The representation that it returns to the PROP subsystem, and is blended
with the output of the OBJ→PROP transformation, is therefore more likely
to be complete in terms of its consistency with the viewer’s SM of the scene
they are viewing.
It is interesting to note the overall similarity between the content of the vari-
ous levels of representation and Eisenstein’s (1949) forms of montage: the vi-
sual level covering the metric and rhythmic changes, the object level covering
the tonal, the PROP covering the intellectual, and the IMPLIC covering the
overtonal. In its distinctions between different levels of mental representation,
the ICS framework inherently captures this early, film-based typology. It is the
different qualitative natures of these levels that give rise to the mental phenom-
ena associated with watching and comprehending an edited film.
To summarize, in this ICS model the viewer is focally aware and concentrat-
ing on the narrative meaning of the film, represented at the implicational level.
Reciprocal activity between the propositional and implicational levels at-
tempts to interpret new information from the scene in terms of this narrative.
The VIS and OBJ subsystems extract information from the seen images, with
the OBJ subsystem interpreting entities in the visual scene in conjunction with
feedback from the PROP subsystem about what is likely, given the current un-
derstanding of the narrative. Comprehension of the visual scene is very much
subsidiary to comprehension of the narrative. In what follows, we argue that in-
consistencies between the subsidiary task and the primary task distract the
viewer from comprehending the narrative, and so are generally to be avoided
unless such an interruption is desired, perhaps for rhetorical effect.
If a cut were to occur at the point in the film represented in Figure 1, the
new visual scene presented to the VIS subsystem would result in a different
visual structure being transformed into object code. The OBJ→PROP pro-
cess would in turn generate a new propositional representation, and this
would have to be blended with the propositional output of the IMPLIC sub-
system, which of course is based on the preceding scene. Broadly speaking, a
cut will be acceptable if the information extracted by the viewer is consistent
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with the representations currently active in the configuration of processes.
Any inconsistencies or ambiguities could shift the locus of dynamic control
away from the IMPLIC subsystem in an attempt to resolve the difficulties
caused by the cut. Because the interpretation of the narrative must be carried
out by the IMPLIC subsystem, the viewer would lose track of what is going
on. For clear comprehension, then, a dynamic display or a film should avoid
locating dynamic control away from the IMPLIC subsystem.
Thewholepointofcutting filmis tomove theviewerrapidly throughanarra-
tive sequence, without waiting for the camera to pan from side to side within a
scene, or to move from place to place to follow the action. Cutting makes it pos-
sible to successively present views that are not spatially or temporally con-
nected. For the resulting sequences to be comprehensible, there must be some
connectionbetweensuccessive shots toenable theviewer to relate themtoeach
other and to the narrative. This relation can be based on the object representa-
tion—when there are similarities in the abstract visual structure displayed on
the screen, or it can be based on the propositional representation—when there
are similarities in the actual elements displayed and their relations.
There are two points at which difficulties in comprehending a cut might
occur. The most obvious would be an inconsistency of the novel proposi-
tional representation with what has gone before (i.e., an unexpected entity
appears on screen, or entities appear in an unexpected relation or position).
This would prevent the viewer from relating the new scene to their expecta-
tions of the narrative, derived from implicational representations. Problems
could also result from cuts that make it difficult for the VIS subsystem to
produce an appropriate object representation (i.e., the attended object’s vi-
sual attributes change substantially). Because these could lead to proposi-
tional difficulties, we examine the object representations first and then turn
to propositional representations. However, before doing so, it is worth re-
stating the importance of implicational representations in the comprehen-
sion of the narrative.
Implicational representations provide a basis for the inferential processing
needed for the viewer to construct the narrative as the events unfold before
them, and we have mentioned their role in providing affective tone to the ex-
perience (a more detailed account of the role of implicational representations
in affect can be found in Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). In terms of narrative
comprehension, these are the most important representations because if these
cannot be formed adequately, the viewer would be able to report nothing
more than the appearance and disappearance of the objects and actors (from
their object representation), or the sequence of events (from the propositional
representation). Only the implicational representation contains the SMs that
correspond to the viewer knowing why the events happen and what they
mean. For those who seek to understand film, per se, the focus has rightly
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been on this level of meaning; however, for our current purposes it is appro-
priate to focus on the representations supporting the perception of the visual
scene: the object and propositional levels of meaning.
5.1. The Role of Object Representations
No theory of dynamic scene perception would be applicable without a
technique or method for analyzing the temporal changes in a viewer’s rep-
resentation of a scene. To support the modeling required by the ICS theory,
we have developed transition path diagrams (TPDs), a notational technique
that enables designers to detail the thematic transitions in the topic of pro-
cessing, step by step, as the scene changes and as the viewer’s attentional fo-
cus moves. The rows of the notation correspond to successive attentional
fixations on a processing topic (the psychological subject of the representa-
tion, shown in a black frame), with the superordinate grouping of that topic,
its predicate, and its constituent structures detailed. Our central argument is
that cinematic cuts that follow normal thematic patterns will be transparent
to the viewer, and they may not even notice their occurrence. Cuts that do
not replicate the effect of a thematic transition, however, will not feel natu-
ral and may be noticed.
An example of a common cinematic practice that illustrates this are match
cuts, which place the element of the new scene that the viewer should attend
to in roughly the same physical location on the screen as the probable psycho-
logical subject of the previous shot. In the example illustrated in Figure 2, af-
ter the actor has raised and fired the gun it is highly likely that the viewer will
have been following the motion of the gun. If the succeeding cut to the gun-
man’s target placed it in roughly the same screen location as the gun, then it
would immediately form the psychological subject of the viewer’s object rep-
resentation. Placing it elsewhere would require the viewer to make a transi-
tion out to the superstructure of the scene, and then in again to a possible tar-
get before they could understand what or who had been shot at.
When there is a cut in a scene, the view changes such that the psychological
subject of the object representation suddenly disappears. The VIS subsystem
must take the new incoming information and transform it into a representa-
tion for the OBJ subsystem. If the visual structure of the new shot is such that
there is nothing in the location of the previous subject that can be used to form
the subject of a new representation, as in sequence B of Figure 2, the VIS sub-
system will take longer to form a new object representation. The OBJ subsys-
tem, meanwhile, will be without a meaningful input and will continue to base
its outputs on the last input it did receive.
When the VIS subsystem has succeeded in reorienting itself to produce an
object code output, the new information will replace that being operated on
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by the OBJ subsystem. The smoothness with which this change can be dealt
with depends on the similarity between the structures of the two representa-
tions. The greater the similarity between the old and new subjects (in terms of
their visual attributes such as shape, color, motion, texture, etc.) and their re-
spective predicate structures, the easier it will be for the transformation pro-
cesses active in the OBJ subsystem to continue to produce output representa-
tions (i.e., propositional representations). Therefore, if a cut were made from
the middle shot of an actor firing a gun to a close-up of the gun, or to a long
shot of the whole scene, the VIS subsystem could retopicalize on the new po-
sition of the gun, although it may be much larger or smaller and in a different
part of the screen, and the identity between the resulting object representa-
tions and that of the preceding middle shot would enable the OBJ→PROP
transformation to proceed seamlessly.
Filmmakers can capitalize on this ability of the OBJ subsystem to cope
with changes in the attributes of the subject of its representation. Cutting be-
tween two highly similar, collocated subjects could lead the viewer to inter-
pret them as being representations of the same object, some of whose attrib-
utes have changed, rather than as representations of different objects (Figure
3). Of course, the more attributes that change, and the less spatially related the
successive objects are, the less likely this is to succeed. A similar technique is
extensively used in animation, where elements can undergo spectacular
transformations of color and shape quite unlike those of their real-world
counterparts without producing any propositional problems for the view-
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Figure 2. The cut in sequence A better conveys who has been shot than the cut in B, be-
cause in A the relevant element of the second shot (the falling man) is collocational with
the subject of the first shot (the gun). A visual transition must be made after the cut in B
to reorient the viewer’s representation from the gray man on the right to the falling man
on the left.
ers—their reaction to the bizarre incongruities in the implicational represen-
tation being amusement.
As Figure 2 showed, collocation can be an important cue as to the element
of the new shot that should be taken to form the subject of the representation,
if it differs from the previous subject, or if there has been a gross change in
some attribute (such as its shape, due to camera angle). In terms of a structural
description of the scene, collocation maintains the relation between the sub-
ject and the psychological predicate of the object representation, at the possi-
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Figure 3. The objects cut together in film A and in film B may be viewed as single objects
whose surface design or shape changes, respectively (the cuts not being apparent),
whereas the objects in film C will be viewed as different objects (the cuts will be appar-
ent). The transition path diagrams below each strip show the relative complexity of
changes occurring to the psychological subject in each case.
ble cost of changing the attributes of the subject and the elements in the predi-
cate. Where the same element should form the subject in succeeding shots,
however, it is usually more important to ensure that its attributes, rather than
its location, are preserved. This may require translation of the subject to a new
position on the screen, rather than collocation.
An example of this occurs when the element that is the subject of the repre-
sentation is moving out of the frame of the shot. Then, if there is a cut to a new
shot, which the element is to enter, preserving its location within the scene is
entirely artificial because the cut is mimicking a change in the position of the
viewers’ head as they turn their gaze to follow the subject’s motion (i.e., their
point of view). Under these circumstances, the subject’s position in relation to
the field of view (i.e., the relation between it and the predicate structure) will
necessarily change.
Maintaining the predicate structure of the representation requires the sub-
ject’s attribute of motion to be changed, altering the relation between the two
shots (Figure 4). Preserving the attribute of motion and allowing the predicate
structure to vary creates a cut that is readily understandable, corresponding as
it does to what would be experienced by a real-world observer moving their
head. Sequence A in Figure 4 (modeled on scenes used by Frith & Robson,
1975) conveys the sense of the camera having turned to track the dog (even if
the real position of the camera has moved); whereas in sequence B, where the
camera has had to move to the other side of the dog’s path, the impression is
of the dog turning around. The camera remained stationary (in practice the
background will have changed too; but even if this is sufficient to contradict
the impression of a stationary camera, it will still not prevent the impression
of the dog’s change in direction—such a cut would be even more opaque than
sequence B).
The collocation of the dog over the cut in sequence B is counterproduc-
tive because the VIS→OBJ transformation can proceed without needing to
retopicalize to find a subject. There is no gross change in the predicate
structure of the representation. The OBJ→PROP transformation is there-
fore likely to interpret any changes in the subject’s attributes as real, rather
than being due to some change in the point of view. As in sequences A and
B of Figure 3, where a single ball appeared to persist with changing attrib-
utes, in sequence B of Figure 4 the dog appears to have turned around. This
would result in a propositional representation quite different to that of se-
quence A, where the retopicalization by the VIS subsystem produces differ-
ent object representations before and after the cut. In this sequence, the
subject’s attributes have been preserved but its predicate structure has al-
tered, allowing the OBJ→PROP transformation to infer a change in the
point of view. The elements being viewed continue their behavior and rela-
tions despite the cut.
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These three examples of cutting in film have illustrated how a structural
description of the object representations, produced by the VIS subsystem,
can help explain the confidence with which certain cuts can be used. The
TPDs help to embody the assumptions about the transitions that are needed,
or which are most likely to occur, and difficulties in making these transitions
result in additional dynamic control requirements within the configuration.
The following summarizes the analyses so far:
• Keeping the psychological subject and its immediate predicate structure
constant corresponds to cuts that close in or open up the shot (e.g., long
shot to middle shot to close-up, and vice versa). These are the most
readily comprehensible transformations of the visual scene, with no ex-
tra processing required by the VIS or OBJ subsystems.
• The subject is translated and its predicate structure changed (i.e., its loca-
tion on the screen and its surroundings change); then, following extra
processing by the VIS subsystem to relocate the subject, a change in the
observer’s point of view is assumed by the OBJ subsystem without dis-
turbing its processing.
• When the predicate structure and the psychological subject both change
(i.e., a cut to a different point of view, with a different element collocated
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Figure 4. When the dog exits right, a cut preserving its location within the structure of
the scene (i.e., collocation) would require it to enter the succeeding shot from the right
(B), altering its attribute of motion. Preserving the attribute of motion requires it to en-
ter from the left (A), an example of translation. The impression gained by a viewer of
the two sequences is quite different.
with the previous subject, even if the previous subject is still somewhere
on screen), then the VIS subsystem will use the new element to produce
the psychological subject of the object representation.
However, this last situation has consequences beyond the VIS→OBJ
transformation, as do cuts where there is no collocated element, and where
the previous subject cannot be found within the scene. Here the OBJ subsys-
tem cannot maintain any continuity between the shots, and the PROP subsys-
tem has to resolve their relation.
5.2. The Role of Propositional Representations
The VIS→OBJ transformations described in the previous section dealt
with the identification of individual elements of the scene, before and after a
cut. Watching a film, of course, involves more than following objects around
from shot to shot. The second step is to understand their relations with each
other, and this is carried out by the transformations from object to proposi-
tional representations (OBJ→PROP). Where the object representation is an
abstract structural description of entities and relations in visual space, the
propositional representation is a description of entities and relations in se-
mantic space.
In the example configuration of Figure 1, the viewer has been looking at
the actor and has watched him raise and fire the gun. The current subject of
their object representation is the gun, from which smoke has just appeared.
The OBJ→PROP transformation uses this object representation to recognize
this object as a gun, to link the smoke spatially with the gun, and to identify
the composite as a gun that has just fired. The element “Smoking Gun” is thus
the psychological subject of the propositional representation, and “Fired, by
Actor 1 … ” the start of the predicate. This representation is used as the basis
for the PROP→IMPLIC transformation that would give rise to the under-
standing that something else had just been shot by Actor 1, as well as produc-
ing the implicational feelings of shock, surprise, and threat, which serve to
contextualize the subsequent processing and give film watching a sense of en-
gagement that would be lacking if it were watched at a solely propositional
level.
The cuts illustrated in Figure 2 would help to clarify just what had been shot.
As explained in the previous section, sequence A of Figure 2, where a person
throwing their arms up and collapsing is collocated with the gun, would lead to
an object representation with this person as the psychological subject. The
propositional representation of “Smoking Gun, Fired by Actor 1” would thus
be succeeded by one with “Person (Surprised, Falling)” as the subject. The im-
plication that the falling person had been shot by Actor 1 would be easy to draw.
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The implicational representation generated by the sight of the smoking gun
wouldhavebeenusedby theIMPLIC→PROPtransformation to feedback the
proposition, “Something, shot by Actor 1.” On the cut, this proposition can be
combined with the information coming from the OBJ subsystem to produce
the richer representation of “Person (Surprised, Falling), shot by Actor 1” im-
mediately,without furtherprocessing. Insteadof seeingashot fired, thenseeing
someone fall, and“workingout” that theyhavebeenshot, theviewer seesa shot
fired and then sees someone being shot.
In sequence B, however, the VIS subsystem is likely to have retopicalized
on the central figure, leading the OBJ→PROP transformation to produce a
propositional representation of “Person (Leaning, Looking screen-right, next
to Person [Surprised, Falling]).” This cannot be successfully combined with
the proposition arriving from the IMPLIC subsystem. One of them would
predominate, with the viewer either focusing on the leaning person, then fol-
lowing their gaze to search the right-hand side of the screen, and so not notic-
ing whom Actor 1 had shot—or focusing on the unsatisfying proposition that
something has been shot and starting a propositionally driven search of the
scene to find who or what. If the next cut followed too quickly, then they
might not succeed in making the connection at all. In neither case does se-
quence B of Figure 2 convey whom Actor 1 shot as clearly as sequence A.
This shows how cuts that force the viewer to form novel subjects in their
object representation rely on the PROP subsystem to make sense of the
scene. The interplay of OBJ→PROP and IMPLIC→PROP will also be ac-
tive when there are no intended propositional links between the subjects of
succeeding shots. When one scene ends and there is a cut to a completely new
scene, the filmmaker must take care that the viewers do not interpret the new
view in the light of the preceding shot. A safe way to do this would be to do
what is not recommended earlier. The filmmaker should ensure that there is
no collocated subject in the second shot (Figure 5), and that the subject of the
first shot does not recur in the second shot; or if it does, then it should have
quite different attributes.
The tendency of viewers to carry over propositional and implicational in-
formation from one shot to the next can be used for narrative effect, of course.
If a collocated subject is present in the second shot, then the propositional at-
tributes of the preceding subject may be blended with it, providing an addi-
tional level of allusion not available from a single shot. This is what is meant
by Eisenstein’s (1949) “overtonal montage,” and a good example can be seen
in Kubrick’s (1968) film 2001: A Space Odyssey. In the first scene—an allusion
to the biblical story of Cain and Abel—a primate who has been cognitively
enhanced by the monolithic Sentinel has learned to use a thigh bone as a
weapon and has just slain a member of another tribe to gain access to a water
hole. At the end of the scene, the primate hurls the bone upward, and the
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camera tracks it as it spins against an empty blue sky. Then, there is a cut to a
space station drifting in space.
Here, Kubrick (1968) presumably wants the viewer to make an implicit as-
sociation between the warlike nature of the thigh bone, made into a weapon
by intelligent action, and the militaristic nature of the space station. He does
this by using the principles outlined in the previous section—the bone and the
space station are in roughly the same location of the screen, they share several
attributes (both are long, thin, and white), and they have a common predicate
structure (moving against the sky). He further removes the chance of the
viewer focusing on an irrelevant element before or after the cut by making the
bone and the space station the only elements in their respective shots. On the
cut, the viewer’s object representations are therefore highly similar, there are
no interruptions to the flow of processing from the VIS subsystem through
the OBJ subsystem to the PROP subsystem, and there is little to challenge the
blending of the propositional representation derived from the implications of
the previous shot blending with the new subject of the propositional represen-
tation. Indeed, if the background sky did not change from white to black,
350 MAY, DEAN, BARNARD
Figure 5. At the end of the first scene in sequence A, the cut to a long shot with no
collocational subject makes it less likely that viewers will make any propositional links
between the shots. The middle shot with the collocational cactus in sequence B could
mislead viewers to associate the cactus with the consequences of the gunshot.
viewers might not realize that the cut divided two scenes, and so might briefly
think that the bone had actually changed into a space station.
Although these end-of-scene cuts are important, cuts that result in a novel
visual structure are more frequent within a single scene, corresponding to dif-
ferent views of various elements as the action continues. Unlike the Kubrick
(1968) cut, these more common internal cuts are generally designed not to be
noticeable. In these cases, the PROP→IMPLIC and IMPLIC→PROP cycle
should be allowed to continue as smoothly as possible, to avoid distracting the
viewer from the narrative. If the change in the predicate structure and the at-
tributes of the subject are such that the OBJ subsystem can infer a movement
of the observer’s point of view, such as change in position or a turning of the
gaze, then this subjective motion will be included as part of the propositional
representation, but only as part of the predicate structure. This will not inter-
fere with the implicational cycle and may be effective in giving the viewers a
sense of their own involvement in the scene, as they apparently move with the
actors (sequence 1 in Figure 6).
If the change is too gross, however, the OBJ subsystem may infer a jump in
the absolute positions of some elements of the scene, leading the viewer to at-
tempt a comprehension of the jump as part of the narrative (sequence 2 in Fig-
ure 6). An even grosser change may prevent both retopicalization by the VIS
subsystem and an inference of subjective motion by the OBJ subsystem. This
would lead to a complete dissociation of the propositional representations, and
the viewer would be likely to interpret the new shot as an unrelated scene. In
these two situations, subsequent IMPLIC→PROP feedback would be hard to
assimilate and may soon indicate that they have misinterpreted the cut. They
would then have to reassess their evaluation of the scene, possibly by accessing
the image record of their PROP subsystem rather than by attending to the in-
coming propositions from the VIS→OBJ, OBJ→PROP path.
The cut shown in sequence 2 of Figure 6 is an example of crossing the axis,
where the two camera positions are on alternate sides of an imaginary line
drawn between the two actors. This is generally accepted as bad practice and
makes certain situations very difficult to set up for filming—Boorstin (1991)
warned about dinner table scenes, where for n people there are n(n – 1)/2 differ-
ent axes that must not be crossed. He described Woody Allen’s (1986) solution
to this in Hannah and Her Sisters was simply to avoid cutting and to slowly rotate
the camera around the periphery of the table, letting each character talk as they
came into the shot (conceptually simple, but demanding on the actors).
Even when there are only two characters, remaining on one side of the
eyeline axis can cause problems. Boorstin (1991) described the problems in-
volved in filming scenes where two characters converse in the front seats of a
moving car (Figure 7). If the eyeline axis is not crossed, then the predicate
structure of the shot must, due to the confined space available for setting up
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the shot, be of the landscape visible through the window behind them. For the
character in the left-hand seat, the landscape will be moving from right to left
across the screen, but when the cut is made to the character in the right-hand
seat, the landscape will be seen to move from left to right. The uncomfortable
consequence of this sort of sequence can, in our analysis, be explained as a
gross disparity in the predicate structure of the scene—the two characters will
appear to be in two different cars going in different directions. Although
crossing the axis can be overcome quickly by the top-down constraints of the
narrative, it momentarily distracts the viewer from the message of the film
and makes them attend to the medium. As with all violations of the stylistic
rules cited here, this can have benefits when used sparingly, but becomes te-
dious if overused.
This section described the consequences for the viewer’s propositional
representations of various forms of cut that can be used in film editing. Where
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Figure 6. Cutting from camera A to camera B (sequence 1) is acceptable because which-
ever actor is the viewer’s psychological subject, there is collocation following the cut,
and the predicate structure is maintained. Cutting from A to C (sequence 2), however,
neither presents collocation or maintains the predicate structure of the scene and would
not be acceptable.
the OBJ subsystem could deal with a range of cuts affecting the abstract visual
structure of the scene, the PROP subsystem can make inferences over cuts
that manipulate the propositional representation in certain ways. The key
points are as follows:
• Viewers will tend to make implicational inferences between successive
propositional subjects. This can be valuable if used carefully, but can be
suppressed by avoiding collocation or translation of subjects over the
cut.
• Changes in the predicate structure of an object representation that can-
not be reconciled with a change in the viewer’s position or gaze will be
represented propositionally as a change in position of the elements of
the scene.
• Shots that cannot be propositionally linked will be interpreted as unre-
lated, unless the implicational representation of the narrative makes it
apparent that there was a relation.
• In the absence of any support for propositional retopicalization, viewers
will carry out exchanges between the central subsystems to resolve the
ambiguity, neglecting the ongoing action.
6. DO FILMMAKERS REALLY MANIPULATE GAZE
DIRECTION?
An untested assumption of the entire argument so far is that filmmakers do
actually attempt to manipulate gaze direction and that their attempts succeed.
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Figure 7. Because of the different flow of elements in the predicate structure of the two
shots, the characters in the front seats of a car appear to be traveling in different direc-
tions.
Although the language of film editing includes terms such as match cut and
jump cut, this does not necessarily mean that filmmaking practice routinely
follows the prescriptive advice of the textbooks. Even if cuts do use colloca-
tion appropriately, there is no guarantee that viewers’ gaze direction is guided
toward the appropriate objects. These two assumptions need to be confirmed
if this particular mapping from film to computer interfaces is to have any
value. To verify these assumptions, we decided to collect some empirical evi-
dence about the gaze direction of the viewers of a commercial film. Our inten-
tion was twofold: first, to find out whether we could detect changes in gaze di-
rection contingent on a cut in the film; second, to see if we could distinguish
between cuts that did result in changes in gaze location from those that did
not, on the basis of our theoretical analysis.
The approach that we took to test this was to record the eye movements of
some volunteers while they watched a full-length commercial feature film, in
its full theatrical aspect ration (in contrast to the “pan and scan” version made
for TV broadcast or VCR distribution). By measuring the location of gaze di-
rections before and after each cut in the film, we can find out whether our vol-
unteers tended to keep their gaze fixed at the same point on the screen follow-
ing a cut, or whether they tended to look at a different place shortly after the
cut. The theoretical analysis that we have given so far predicts that some types
of cuts should make use of collocation, and so should not result in a change in
gaze direction, whereas other types should not use collocation, and should re-
sult in changes in gaze direction. By looking at the relative positions of gaze
direction around a cut, instead of the absolute position, we avoid the need to
define specific regions of interest for each shot, which would involve guessing
the filmmakers’ intentions. In effect, we are just looking at the consequences
of the editing process. This is important because if we (as experimenters) were
to attempt to identify the objects that we (as viewers) felt the director wanted
us to be looking at before and after the cut, and then found that our volunteers
also looked at the same objects, we would have found out no more than that
they were watching the film in the same way that we were. Measuring only
changes in relative gaze direction is not only simpler, it is more objective.
We took a DVD version of the Columbia Pictures film The Mask of Zorro
(Campbell, 1998) and identified every cut. In the film’s 132 min, there were
1,916 cuts (roughly one every 4 sec). We then classified the cuts according to an
objective taxonomy, based on what is actually portrayed on the screen before
and after a cut, rather than being expressed in intentional terms (such as
Bernstein’s, 1988, set of nine sequences listed earlier).
The classes of cuts are listed in Figure 8, together with their frequency of
occurrence in the film. Seven of the classes, which are described later, were
defined a priori, but three were added during the classification process (spe-
cifically, over-the-shoulder, previous, and topical cuts) as special instances of
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other classes. An initial classification was carried out by Jon May, and then re-
examined by Michael P. Dean, with 185 cases (9.7%) being queried. A con-
sensus reclassification was reached in each case. We then proceeded to deter-
mine whether, on the basis of the principles inferred from our theoretical
analysis, each type of cut would benefit from the use of collocation or not.
The most obvious class in which collocation should be used is detail. This
corresponds to the computer interface example of clicking on an object with a
zoom tool to magnify or shrink it. If collocation were not found here, the cen-
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Class
Description of Shots Before
and After Cut n
Benefit
From
Collocation
Peak Eye
Movement
(msec) F(1, 45)
Detail Closing in or opening out from
a detail
54 Yes No peak ns
Result Result of some cause or action
shown in first shot
61 Yes 280 to 440 8.15**
Following Different views of moving
person or object
276 Yes No peak ns
Conversation Shots of two or more actors
involved in a conversation
560 No 120 to 200 37.5***
Subjective First shot of an actor looking at
object; second shot of that
object without actor in shot
142 No 120 to 280 18.8***
Over the
shoulder
First shot of an actor looking at
object; second shot of that
object with rear view of actor
in shot
26 Yes 120 to 280 7.03*
Previous Second shot returns to view
used previously with no
more than two intervening
shots
149 No 120 to 200 4.70*
Topical Second shot contains objects
whose presence is
predictable from first shot
341 Yes 120 to 280 46.3***
Novel Second shot contains new
scene or objects whose
presence is not predictable
from first shot
95 No No peak ns
End of scene Unrelated in time or place;
start of a new scene
27 No 200 to 280 10.1**
Note. Ratios were nonsignificant at the p > .05 level.
*p < .05.**p < .01.***p < .001.
Figure 8. Classification of film cuts, together with number of each within the film The
Mask of Zorro (Campbell, 1998), predicted benefit of collocation, and time of statistical
peak in eye movements.
tral example that has been cited as a justification for using film as informative
for interface design would be disproved. A second class where collocation
may be predicted is that the results of some cause or action in one shot should
be collocated in the second shot (result): for example, an actor firing a gun in
one shot and a person falling in the second. Collocation allows the two events
to be linked; not collocating would require the viewer to search the screen to
find the result, perhaps not seeing it before it had concluded. The third case,
following the motion of an actor or object across the screen by cutting to differ-
ent camera positions, should also generally use collocation, although there
are some predictable exceptions. If the actor or object should exit on one side
of the screen before the cut, another principle rules that they should be travel-
ing in the same direction in the second shot. This requires them to be in shot
following the cut or to reenter on the opposite side. Both options prevent col-
location. These cuts occurred very rarely, however, and so were conserva-
tively included within the following class.
Three classes involve a cut from an actor’s face to something that they are
looking at: a situation that can make use of eyeline cutting, in which the
viewer tends to follow the direction of gaze of the actor across the screen to lo-
cate the new object of interest. Therefore, conversation cuts (between two or
more actors who are looking at each other while they are talking) and subjec-
tive cuts (that show the object that the actor had been looking at) need not use
collocation, but can place the object (or second actor’s face) at a point be-
tween the first actor’s face and the edge of the screen. We also identified a spe-
cial instance of subjective cutting, which portrays the object that an actor was
looking at from the point of view of a person looking over their shoulder, thus
including a rear view of the actor and gives the viewer the sense of sharing
their perspective. These we called over-the-shoulder cuts and felt that these
should use collocation of the actor’s face and the object, because of the confu-
sion of also having the actor in shot after the cut, a potential distraction for the
viewer, who might expect them to remain the topic.
Some cuts were returns to previous shots of an object or scene that had
very recently been seen from exactly the same camera position (previous). Be-
cause the viewer would be familiar with the structure of the shot, these need
not use collocation, provided that few shots had intervened (we used a crite-
rion of no more than two intervening shots). Three classes of cut were to ob-
jects or scenes that had not recently been in shot. Where the cut was to an ob-
ject whose presence was predictable from the first shot, being topically related
by the narrative, collocation would aid the viewer in making the link. For a
cut to a new topic, however, whose presence was not topically related to the
narrative (novel), we felt that collocation should be avoided, lest the viewer
carry over propositional information from the previous shot to the new topic.
The final class of cut was that which occurred at the end of scene, with the new
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shot typically being an “establishing shot” or long shot of the new scene.
Again, collocation between an object on the previous shot and one in the new
scene would lead the viewer to think that they might be related in some way,
and so should be avoided.
6.1. Method
There were five participants in this experiment, all students at the Univer-
sity of Sheffield. A small sample is typical in this type of psychophysical study
because the statistical comparisons of interest are within participants, in this
case between each individual’s gaze position at different times relative to cuts
in a film. All participants had normal, uncorrected vision. They were paid
£10 for their participation. None had seen the film before. They were told
that the study was investigating eye movements made while people were
watching films, but not that cuts were of particular interest. Drinking water
was provided on request throughout the data collection period.
The film was presented in DVD format on a wide-screen television,
viewed by participants from a chair at a distance of 150 cm, with the center of
the screen approximately level with the participants’ eyes. The film was pre-
sented with a widescreen aspect ratio, 58 cm wide and 24.5 cm high, thereby
subtending a visual angle of approximately 22° horizontally and 9° vertically
and containing the entire image as intended for the film’s original cinema for-
mat, which was at a 1:2.35 aspect ratio. This visual angle is the same as would
be obtained by a cinema screen 10 m wide × 4.25 m high, viewed from a dis-
tance of 25.5 m. By comparison, a 20 in. (40 cm × 30 cm) computer monitor,
viewed from 60 cm, subtends approximately 38° horizontally and 29° verti-
cally. It should be noted that the small screens of computer interfaces are
small only in terms of their physical size, not in terms of the eye movements
needed to search them.
Each participant was tested individually. The film was presented in its en-
tirety (132 min, plus approximately 10 min setup time). During this time, the
participant’s eye movements were recorded using an Applied Science Group
4250R Eye Tracker, which uses no head restraint and tracks the participant’s
head position through a small magnet worn on a headband. This apparatus
made the situation as naturalistic as possible for a laboratory setting. The X
and Y coordinates of each participant’s gaze location were logged in a com-
puter file, at a rate of once per video field (i.e., every 20 msec) for the entire
film. As the time of occurrence of each cut was known, eye movements fol-
lowing each of the 1,916 cuts in the film could be examined with this fine tem-
poral detail. The X and Y coordinates were in the form of square pixels in the
range 0 to 430 and 0 to 180, respectively, with each pixel subtending approxi-
mately 3 min of arc in each dimension.
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6.2. Results
The data for one participant were excluded from analysis, as 9.5% of the
total coordinates were not in the area defined by the television screen. For the
remaining four participants, any X and Y coordinates beyond an edge of the
film (caused by blinks, tracking error, occasional glances away from the film,
etc.) were replaced by the values corresponding to the respective edge (2.2%
of coordinates being replaced, a maximum of 3.4% per participant). One hun-
dred eighty-five cuts that were followed by another cut within 1 sec were
omitted from the analysis (by proportion, mainly result, detail, or following
cuts), leaving 1,731 cuts per participant.
The size of the change in gaze position in minutes of arc, disregarding direc-
tion, was calculated for 16 successive 40-msec intervals, beginning 40 msec be-
fore each cut in the film and continuing up to 600 msec after the cut. This was
chosen rather than the 20 msec provided by the raw data because there are two
fields of video data presented per video frame, with a new frame being shown
every 40 msec (there are 24 frames per second in cine film, one of these frames
being repeated in theconversion tovideoandDVDformats). Foreachcut, gaze
position was in consequence measured for 16 consecutive frames, beginning
with the frame before the cut and ending on the 14th frame after the cut. For
each of the 10 classes of cut, mean changes in gaze location were computed for
each of these 40 msec intervals for each participant. These data, and their
means across participants, are plotted in Figure 9. Note that data represent eye
movements since the last interval and not since the cut, and so if multiplied by
25, the vertical axis represents velocity per second. Because of the averaging
process, the size of the changes are not as large as the change in gaze position for
a single cut: If 40 cuts had been averaged, and each produced a 4° change in
gaze position, but the changes occurred equally often after six to nine frames,
the average change would be just 1° or 60 min of arc. The shape of the line is
more important. Successive random changes in gaze position around a single
point would result in a flat line; if gaze were completely fixed (which is not likely
in eye movement data), the line would be at zero along the x-axis. If eye move-
ments are being made at a systematic point in time following a cut, however, a
peak in the velocity should be detectable.
One factor within participants’ analyses of variance were carried out on
the data for each class of cut, with the 16 measurement points used as levels of
the time factor. Reliable effects were found for the following classes: conver-
sation, F(15, 45) = 4.712, p < .01; end of scene, F(15, 45) = 2.459, p < .05; over
the shoulder, F(15, 45) = 2.712, p < .01; previous, F(15, 45) = 3.489, p < .01; re-
sult, F(15, 45) = 2.285, p < .05; subjective, F(15, 45) = 2.884, p < .01; and topi-
cal, F(15, 45) = 4.269, p < .01. There were no effects of time for detail, follow-
ing, and novel classes.
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Where reliable effects of time on degree of eye movement were found, the
locus of the effect (i.e., when the eye movements took place) was examined
with a hierarchical set of linear contrasts. This amounts to determining where
statistically significant peaks are in Figure 9. The set of contrasts comprised a
comparison of the first half of the data with the second half (–40 to 280 msec
vs. 280 to 600 msec); then, within that first half of the data, a comparison of its
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Figure 9. Size of change in gaze location in each 40-msec interval following the 10 classes of cut.
first half (–40 to 120 msec) with its second half (120 to 280 msec); and so on
until comparisons between adjacent intervals of 40 msec were made.
The peak amount of eye movement occurs between 120 and 200 msec af-
ter the cut for conversation and previous cuts; between 120 and 280 msec for
over-the-shoulder, subjective, and topic cuts; between 200 and 280 msec for
end-of-scene cuts; and between 280 and 440 msec for result cuts. None of the
other contrasts examined was statistically significant, and so no peaks are
identifiable for detail, following, and novel classes. These results are summa-
rized in Figure 9, together with the F ratios of the relevant linear contrasts.
A constant amount of movement could represent a steady drift in gaze loca-
tionacross the screenormovementbackand fortharoundasinglepoint.Todis-
tinguish these possibilities, we calculated the distance that gaze had moved for
each cut between the cut and the frame 240 msec later, the point at which most
classes of cut were registering their peak amount of eye movement. We then
counted the proportion of these gaze deviations that were greater than 1.5° of
arc (Figure 10), this figure being taken as an approximation of the amount of
movement that might be expected from saccades around a stable object.
With the exception of over-the-shoulder and novel cuts, the rank ordering
of the classes supports the predictions made in Figure 8, with classes expected
to benefit from collocation resulting in a lower proportion of large eye move-
ments than other classes.
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Figure 10. Percentage of each class of cut that resulted in changes in gaze location of
more than 1.5° of arc within 240 msec. (White bars indicate those expected to use collo-
cation; shaded bars indicate those not expected to use collocation.)
6.3. Discussion
The linear contrasts performed on the data identify the time intervals in
which most eye movement occurred. A rank ordering of the classes of cut can
be made: Eye movements follow most rapidly after conversation and previ-
ous cuts; then over-the-shoulder, subjective, and topical cuts; then end of
scene; and following at the longest latency after result cuts. Because there are
no statistically discernable peaks for the remaining three classes, they can be
said not to induce eye movements.
This is not exactly the expected pattern of results, as listed in Figure 8. Four
of the cuts producing eye movements had been expected to do so (conversa-
tion, previous, subjective, and end of scene), but over the shoulder and topical
had not (however, note that these two classes were added during the classifi-
cation process as special instances of subjective cuts). Although collocation
(and hence low eye movements) had been expected for detail and following
cuts, it had not been expected for a novel cut. It had also been expected for re-
sult, but late eye movements were found. Six of the 10 cuts behaved as we ex-
pected (accounting for 1,327 cuts in the entire film, or 69%), three did not (503
cuts), and one was ambiguous (86 cuts).
The pattern of results from the analysis of the size of gaze direction made
within 240 msec of the cut (Figure 10) is broadly consistent with the eye move-
ment data. The greatest proportion of large changes in gaze direction occurs
with the previous and conversation classes of cut. Over-the-shoulder, end of
scene, subjective, detail, and topical cuts are intermediate. Following, novel,
and result cuts show the least proportion of large changes. The main differ-
ences are the comparatively high proportion of large changes made for detail
cuts and the low proportion made for result cuts—although the point at which
the latter’s peak for eye movements occurred had not been reached at 240
msec. The white bars in Figure 10 indicate classes for which collocation had
been expected, and it can be seen that apart from over-the-shoulder and
novel cuts, the order of the classes is in line with expectations.
In summary, the different classes of film cut, as defined here, have been
shown to result in different patterns of eye movement in a manner that is
broadly, but not entirely, in line with the assumption that collocation would
be useful in some cases but not others. Taking all of the measures together, it
would appear that the classes of cut that induce the least large eye movements
soon after the cut are detail, topical, following, novel, and result. Four of these
were predicted to use collocation, the exception being novel cuts.
Over-the-shoulder cuts were predicted to benefit from collocation, but do not
seem to use it.
There are a number of factors that could contribute to differences in eye
movement latency. The visual scene displayed following different classes of
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cut might have different properties that affect preattentive selection of the
next object. For example, the scene following an over-the-shoulder cut typi-
cally has a portion of the display occupied by an actor’s back, thus making the
area likely to contain the next target object both smaller and more salient, and
simultaneously limiting the filmmakers’ chances of using collocation. This
may be why the predicted use of collocation was not detected for this class of
cut. In other cases, the next target location may be highly predictable (e.g., the
left–right alternation of actors’ faces during extended conversation se-
quences). Memory may determine the target point of gaze following recogni-
tion that the shot has been seen before (previous cuts), or the target location
might be cued prior to the cut by an actor’s glance in a particular direction
(subjective cuts). As predicted, none of these three classes of cut seem to be
making use of collocation.
The latency of eye movements to a new stimulus appearing between 20 to
240 min of arc from fixation has been reported as never less than 140 msec
(Ginsborg, 1953). More recently, a figure of 220 msec has been given for the
execution of eye movements to unpredictable locations (Fischer & Weber,
1993). Ditchburn (1973) reported that when timing, direction, and magnitude
of pulsed movements of a target are all unpredictable, latencies of eye move-
ments are in the range of 200 ± 50 msec; but these latencies are reduced when
the pulse is partly predictable. Latencies for the most quickly initiated eye
movements (following conversation cuts) are in the 120- to 200-msec interval.
We can conclude that these eye movements must use information available to
the viewer prior to the cut and might even have been initiated before the cut.
It may be that in choosing when to cut a shot, in these cases the editor has de-
termined the frame by which the viewer is likely to have moved their gaze,
and placed the cut there, effectively following their change in gaze rather than
driving it.
This conclusion is more definite when considering that the display used in
this experiment contains a wealth of complex visual information and usually
several objects, rather than the simple offset and onset of dots that contributed
to minimum latency figures cited in the literature. As mentioned, target loca-
tions following cuts during extended conversations are highly predictable (of-
ten comprising a series of left–right alternations), and an impending cut is in-
variably cued by that actor completing their utterance with the completion of
sense, changes in prosody and the glances that cue turn taking so successfully
in everyday conversation.
The precueing of a cut by an actor’s glance in a particular direction may
also be an important determinant of the latency of eye movements following
subjective cuts. To examine the role of such information, the existence of such
glances and their direction would need to be related to the locations of postcut
selected objects and to the temporal dynamics of eye movements, a feasible
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enterprise that is beyond the scope of this study. At a more general level, the
timing of cuts (rather than the locations of objects) may be cued by preceding
shots being in some way complete (e.g., a fight scene finally having a victor or
a moving car coming to a standstill). Cuts are not directly cued in such cir-
cumstances but do follow with high probability as this is part of the conven-
tional language of narrative filmmaking.
Predictions about collocation with topically related and novel topics were
clearly in the wrong direction. It had been expected that collocation should
be used when the objects of interest before and after the cut were topically re-
lated, but that it should not be used when the novel topic could not be pre-
dicted from the narrative. The data indicate that the reverse is happening:
Novel cuts induce one of the lowest amounts of eye movement; topical cuts
induce more. Here the analogy between film and computer interface tasks
may be helpful in the reverse direction: Unexpected windows and alerts are
commonly designed so that they are unavoidable, opening “in front” of the
user’s current focus. Expected task-related dialogs often appear to one side so
that the focus to which they refer is not obscured. It may be that when the film
viewer can anticipate the object of interest after the cut, they can also antici-
pate a noncollocated position; certainly, the predictable identity of the related
topic makes the subsequent visual search easy. The relevance of a novel topic,
however, is less apparent, and so using collocation removes the need for the
dual task of visual search plus assessment for narrative relevance. After all, if
an unexpected object appears in an unattended position, it is unlikely to be
noticed; if it is necessary for it to be noticed, it had better be placed where the
viewer will see it. This would be more important than avoiding the carryover
of propositional information suggested by our theoretical model.
The strongest claims about the benefit of collocation were made for detail,
result, and following cuts; and all of these three classes do seem to have resulted
in the fewest fast eye movements, although the data for detail cuts is the most
noisy. Taken at face value, this confirms May and Barnard’s (1995) suggestion
that computer interface designers should take into account the relative posi-
tions of the expected locus of visual attention before and after a window has
been opened. When cutting in or out from a view, the detail that has been oper-
ated on (or selected) should be collocated. When an object has been operated
on, any view of the results of this operation should be collocated with the focus
of the operation, even if they are displayed in a new window. When an object
that is selected or being operated on is moving so that it will soon move beyond
the window, the point of view represented should be changed (corresponding
toachange incameraposition) toavoid this, keeping theobject collocated.This
last possibility is the hardest to exemplify in applications that use two-dimen-
sional scenes, such as word processors or graphical editors; representations of
three-dimensional scenes, such as computer-aided design applications, data
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navigation, and even virtual reality devices might profit from the application of
this common filmmaking technique.
7. APPLICATION TO INTERFACE DESIGN
In Ridley Scott’s (1982) film Blade Runner, the title character is searching
for information in a high-resolution hologram snapshot. He selects a point
within the picture and instructs the computer to expand the resolution—but
instead of a smooth zoom in or a cut straight to the highest resolution, the
computer makes a series of four or five cuts, each one of progressively greater
resolution. Because this is a completely fictional situation, there are no tech-
nological constraints on the design of this interaction. Although it could be ar-
gued that the director wants to impress on the viewers this sequence of pro-
cessing that is being carried out on the image, the discrete steps into the detail
of the image also make it readily apparent just what is going on, both for the
narrative of the film (the character presumably knows what his command
meant, but the viewers might not) and for the character as a user of the sys-
tem—although he might know what command he gave, he still has to be able
to comprehend the results.
Ridley Scott’s experience as a film editor could have prompted him to use
a single collocated close-up, but because the viewpoint of the image also had
to rotate slightly to reveal a previously occluded element in the snapshot, he
realized that this would not work. Instead he chose a series of close-ups, each
of which shifted the viewpoint by a small amount, keeping the distortion of
the predicate structure in the view to manageable proportions. Although the
interrogation of hologram snapshots is still future technology, three-dimen-
sional animations are currently used for the display of complex data struc-
tures, and this issue of motion through the representation is critical.
The recommendations that we have made for the construction of film cuts,
involving the collocation and translation of the psychological subject and the
maintenanceorotherwiseof thepredicate structureof the scene, canbeapplied
to the design of computer displays. It may seem obvious that, on changing a dis-
play fromonerepresentation toaclose-upofpartof that representation, theele-
ment that the user is working on should be kept within the screen; but as de-
scribed in the introduction, not all current graphical editing packages follow
even this simple rule. Some make the center of the current image the center of
the new image, so that elements that were around the edge of the display vanish
and the user must scroll to bring them back into view—and if the center of the
image was blank, the resulting blank screen is not much use in helping the user
todecide thedirection to scroll. Inmultiwindowingenvironments, it seems that
no consideration at all is given to the adverse consequences of collocation on
the equivalent of end-of-scene cuts—the closing of windows or their replace-
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ment on switching from one application to another. The result is that one win-
dow’s contents is replaced on the screen by what was previously behind it, re-
gardless of the lack of propositional and implicational correspondence.
It is a common assumption that in moving through a three-dimensional
representation, it is an advantage to use a continuous transformation of the
display so that objects being approached gradually increase in size and resolu-
tion, with objects that are being passed by smoothly slipping out to one side or
other of the display, such as the “walking metaphor” and “logarithmic flight”
of Robertson, Card, and Mackinlay (1993). Such interfaces certainly create a
vivid illusion of motion in the viewer, sometimes to the point of inducing mo-
tion sickness or unpleasant after effects. Where the user just wants to get more
detail about a particular element, our model suggests that a simple cut to a
close-up view would be sufficient; perhaps as in Ridley Scott’s (1982) exam-
ple, over in a few discrete steps to recreate the effect of a transition in the ob-
ject representation to the element’s visual substructure.
Similarly, in moving from close-up displays of one region to another, our
analysis of visual transitions through a structural representation of the scene
suggests that it may be best to do so via a smaller scale overview that encom-
passes both regions. Collocation could be used on the opening-up cut, with a
pan across the view to bring the new destination to the center (or some other
cue to make it the subject of the user’s object representation), followed by a
collocated close-up to the relevant part of the new region. This would allow
both the object and propositional representations to be formed without diffi-
culty. An example is the “small screen map” discussed by Barnard, May, and
Green (1991). In this scenario an on-screen information map was being devel-
oped for the general public to find their way around, to get an overview of the
general area, and to identify key detailed points. These tasks require different
levels of detail; due to the small screen being used, the whole map could not
be shown at the highest required magnification.
Three design alternatives were suggested, but these all tried to avoid
switching between displays on the assumption that users would benefit from
having both scales of map available simultaneously. It should be clear from
our model of the cognition involved in the interpretation of a visual scene that
people cannot focus on information from disparate parts of the visual scene si-
multaneously.
A design that was suggested following this realization replaced the visual
transitions that the user would need to make between different areas of a sin-
gle display with changes in the screen display (Figure 11). Instead of the user
having to attend to a different part of the display, the whole display would be
taken up by the new scale view. To move to another detailed view, the user
would first move back out to the overview and indicate the new point that
they wished to focus on.
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One of the original design suggestions was to present the overview on
two thirds of the screen and have a detailed view in the remaining one
third. Although these areas would remain in fixed positions on the display,
the user could move the logical position of the detailed view (and hence its
contents) around the overview, where it would be represented by drawing a
box or reversing the colors of the area represented. In addition to the prob-
lems of making a visual transition between the elements in the overview
and the detailed view that we have described, this suggestion also faces the
same difficulties as the portrayal of a conversation in the front seat in a car
(Figure 7)—as the detailed view was moved in one direction across the
overview, elements within it would smoothly scroll in the opposite direc-
tion. If the user tried to look from one view to the other, the contrasting
flow of elements in the predicate structures would make it very difficult to
relate the two representations.
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Figure 11. The small screen map interface, showing four successive screens. The user
clicks on Baden-baden (1) and there is a cut to a close-up showing a street map of
Baden-baden (2)—the new display uses the shape of the major roads to preserve the im-
mediate predicate structure around the center of the crosshairs and adds in the minor
roads. The user then moves the crosshairs to the Kirche (3) and clicks again for a further
close-up (4)—the new display uses collocation to position the name of the view appropri-
ately (the location would depend, of course, on the position of the crosshairs in the pre-
ceding display controlled by the user).
These examples have dealt with situations where the user is driving the in-
teraction, and the display is responding to their commands. This is apparently
quite different to the narrative style of films where the user is passively led
through the sequence of shots, and yet in our examples the visual composi-
tion of the display has been actively determined by the computer to facilitate
the user’s comprehension of the scene—the degree of change between the
successive cuts into the holographic snapshot and the positioning of the text
labels in the small screen map scenario, for example. Interactions where the
computer might take an even more active role, such as in process monitoring
displays, could also benefit from the application of these techniques to alert
the user to important events. They could also provide a basis for the design of
dynamic displays where essentially static displays are currently used, for in-
stance in videoconferencing—one participant watching two others converse
would benefit from having an “eyeline match” created for them, rather than
having them both talk directly to the camera.
Experimental findings with the hydra prototype videoconferencing system
support this conclusion. The hydra system provides a single 8 cm screen for
each participant, mounted above a camera in a desktop display unit. A num-
ber of these desktop units can be arranged in each conference location to rep-
resent the distant participants. As participants turn their head to look from
one unit to another, their images in the remote locations appear to look to-
ward the appropriate participant’s unit. Sellen (1992) reported that people
preferred this system to a single screen with multiple windows because they
could tell when other people were attending to them and could selectively at-
tend to other individuals.
Another important difference between film and interface displays that has
been mentioned in passing is that the scene represented on the film screen is
usually of a single, coherent physical setting, whereas an interface display often
represents views of several unconnected applications or processes. Film view-
ers seemquiteable towatchasceneof, say,acity streetwithoutdifficultydespite
many different events happening simultaneously (people and vehicles moving
in several different directions and lights flashing on or off), but an interface with
these properties would seem very busy and distracting. Our analysis of the vi-
sual structure allows us not only to explain why this is but allows us to make rec-
ommendations about making the interface display’s “busyness” manageable.
Thepropositional representationof the filmedstreet scenemayhavea lotgoing
on, but the elements and their attributes are all consistent with a single schema,
and can hence be contained within a single implicational representation. In
film terms, they are part of the same narrative. If the viewer does make one of
the background elements of the scene the subject of their propositional repre-
sentation (due to its visual salience, perhaps), they can do so without requiring a
lotofPROP→IMPLICandIMPLIC→PROPtransformations toderiveanew
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implicational representation to comprehend it. They can also make a transition
back to the appropriate element of the scene without difficulty. This is clearly
not the case with an interface display where a spreadsheet may be partially hid-
den by a word-processing window, with a video image running in another cor-
ner and an “incoming mail” flag flashing on the menu bar.
An example of a problematic multiwindow display arose at a workshop in-
volving commercial interface designers, where we were asked to model some
interfaces that had been brought along by the designers. One of these was a
view of a screen from an electron microscopy analysis package with several
different windows. One window contained a view of a microscopy sample,
others the results of an analysis of the constituents detected in the sample, but
represented in different ways (as pie charts, histograms, tables, etc.). Each
window had its own menu bar, although these were all identical; there were
several display elements that were common to each window (e.g., the atomic
symbols). As the pointer was moved across the view of the sample, a histo-
gram of the analysis would update in another window. Although many of the
display elements thus had a “common fate” and their representations were in-
terdependent, their separation into different windows made this difficult to
determine. While trying to understand the interface design, in fact, we
worked through the substructure of each window, verbalizing the proposi-
tional representations that we could form, until on about the third window we
were able to form the implicational recognition that they were all really repre-
sentations of the same information—whereupon our verbalization became,
“Oh, right!” The problem of making the link between a particular graphical
or tabular portrayal of the data and the histogram that it had been derived
from could be simplified considerably by showing them in the same win-
dow—unifying their object representations, and so making explicit the prop-
osition that they were based on the same sample.
To be fair, this screen display was a little more cluttered than it would be in
practice, because it was an “advertising shot” taken to show all of the possible
functions simultaneously. In practice the users would not call for a pie chart
and two different tables for the same data simultaneously—but as an advert it
was probably counterproductive in that it gave the impression of a rather con-
fusing interface. The desire to show off all of the attractive features of an inter-
face at once is often apparent in displays of multimedia technology, particu-
larly where the machine is able to show more than one moving image at a
time. Although this feature does have useful application in multipoint
videophony, for example, or in allowing two colleagues to collaboratively
watch or edit a video clip, the displays seldom reflect the implicational unity
of these applications. Instead, one image will zoom in while another will
zoom out and a third is panning across a different scene entirely. The experi-
ence of trying to look at these displays is not pleasant.
368 MAY, DEAN, BARNARD
8. UNDERSTANDING SCENIC AND STRUCTURAL
CHANGE
To make a start at understanding how the attributes and location of the psy-
chological subject of a scene (and its predicate structure) can be manipulated
in computer displays, we can identify three broad types of dynamic change in
the scene:
1. If the display changes (e.g., a new window replaces the previous focus)
and offers a new structure that has an element located close to the pre-
ceding subject, this will become the user’s new focus of processing. This
is a transition by collocation.
2. If the display changes and the new structure does not contain an ele-
ment that is located close to the preceding subject, the user will estab-
lish a new focus either by retopicalizing on a translation of the previ-
ous subject (i.e., in a new location on the screen) or on another
significant element. Any new subject will be determined by the sa-
lience of the elements of the new structure and their proximity to the
previous focus.
3. If the display does not change entirely but the structure is altered by the
repositioning of elements, or the alteration in the attributes of some ele-
ments (e.g., brightness, size, or color), then the user may make an invol-
untary transition to a new focus.
In these three generalizations we distinguish between a scenic change, where
the complete structure changes (1 and 2); and a structural change, where ele-
ments of the structure move or their attributes are altered (3). This last type
corresponds to the jump cut, which is generally regarded as unfilmic because
of its propositional consequences for the narrative, but which for the same
reasons may be valuable in a computer interface because it serves to interrupt
processing and attract the user’s attention to the incongruous element of the
display. Just like the balls in Figure 3, the degree of change in the element’s at-
tributes will determine whether they appear to be consistent objects whose
appearances vary or whether they appear to be appearing and disappearing,
and hence more likely to force a retopicalization of the user’s object represen-
tation. These questions must remain open for now, but could potentially be
resolved empirically.
In conclusion, it is possible to describe the effects that have been developed
to direct and maintain the film viewer’s comprehension by adopting a reason-
ably concise set of rules concerning the construction of the screen image. These
rules could be tested with a methodology that examines the ease with which
people can comprehend simple sequences of images that either accord with or
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contradict them. These scenes would have to be constructed explicitly to vio-
late filmic principles; so rather than obtaining them from existing commercial
films, as we have done here, the material would have to be produced explicitly
for the investigation, with the participation of professional filmmakers, and
preferably embedded within a reasonably realistic narrative. Computer dis-
plays that change dynamically are no different in principle because users must
comprehend the changes that have taken place, and so should also benefit from
theunderstandingofdisplayconstruction that these rulescanprovide.Here the
empirical work is more amenable to laboratory investigation within a conven-
tional HCI environment, perhaps using eye tracking equipment to test our pre-
dictions about the timing of changes in gaze location and the occurrence of dis-
playchanges.Furtherworkcould thenbedirected toward themappingofother
filmic principles to interface design, and perhaps even to work on the modeling
of narrative construction.
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